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It's well known that Kant paid little attention to the history of philosophy. The discussions about
his predecessors were not systematical, but they responded to inner, precise problems of his
philosophy. The same concerns Descartes. Kant wrote on the problematical idealism of Descar¬
tes shortly in the Prolegomena (§49) and then in the second edition of the Critique of Pure
Reason (1787), in the "Refutation of Idealism", an addition that responded to criticism of the
first edition.
When Kant speaks about improvement of the philosophy by Descartes, we can see that
his role was thought as very modest.1 It's true that some aspects of Descartes' philosophy al¬
ready put forward some critical ideas (Regulae, AT IV 396-7), especially the general idea of the
'cogito'. But we are still far away from Kant.
Descartes tries to gain a firm foundation of philosophy with the methodical doubt. He crit¬
icises Aristotelian logic, because it couldn't lead to any new knowledge. But his own methodo¬
logy is analytical in the same way, because he's just trying to find a legitimation of scientific
activity, not being able, in fact, to explain the passage from 'cogito' to real science. First, he for¬
gets that he needs the principle of contradiction during the whole process of doubt. Moreover,
he would have to suppose a subject of the doubt from the very beginning, and he shouldn't reach
it as a result of doubt. That's why the 'cogito' appears as a result of a conclusion, an idea that
Kant criticises repeatedly. Descartes himself sees the problem but just when he is criticised (an¬
swers to the second objections, AT VII 140). Finally, when Descartes defends an idea of the 'res
cogitans', he moves from "cogito' to 'cogitatio', retaking the whole scheme of the old subs¬
tance metaphysic that Kant definitely refuses (KrV, A254-6).
There are many signs that show Descartes being unable to provide a synthetical philosophy.
The idea of the 'cogito' as the first known is one of them (Regulae, AT VIII 395). As for Kant,
there's no privilegíate access to the subject.2 One receives a knowledge of the subject in his
act of knowing itself, because he's aiming for objectivity from the very beginning.-1 But the most
clear lack is the need of God to explain everything. The 'cogito' is the first principle perhaps, but
God is the source of all truth, and even the origin ofmovement. The problem is that he needs the
principle ofcausality to prove the existence of God, and he uses it without reasoning the validity
of this principle before stablishingthe source ofall validity. How can he pass from 'cogito'to God
if God is the source of all truth? The progress ofKant in this sense is immense. Now it's the sub¬
ject which has to explain everything, and which has to act by himself.4
1 "Ein nicht geringes Verdienst um dieselbe (Verbesserung der spekulativen Philosophie) crwarb sich
Descartes, indent er viel dazu beitnig, dem Denken Deutlichkeit zu geben durch sein aufgestelltes (Critérium der
Wahrheit, das er in die Klarheit und Evidenz der Erkenntnis setzte", Logik, AA IX 32.
2 "Das Bewufitsein seiner selbst ist also noch lange nicht ein Erkenntnis seiner selbst", KrV, B158.
3 "Iclt mul) Gegenstande meines Denkens haben und sie apprehendieren denn sonst bin ich meiner selbst
unbcwuBt (cogito, sum: es darl'nich ergo lauten)". Op, AA XXI 82.
4 "nicht Gott als Wesen in der Welt, sondem die reine Idee der Selbstkonstruktion gleich die reine Intelligenz
des Subjekts selbst". Op, AA XXI 152.
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If the progress in the theoretical philosophy isn't enough to convince everyone, a look at
the moral philosophy of both thinkers definitely shows that there is not a way back to Descartes.
In Kant's philosophy we confront a subject which is not a substance but just activity:
Die analyiisclie Einheit der Apperzeption ist nur unter der Voraussetzung irgend einer synlhetischen
mûglich, KrV, B133.
The importance of this activity becomes more and more clear in the second edition of the
first Critique, and we find the main idea behind it again published the following year in
the second Critique:
Der BegrilTder Freiheit (...) macht nun den SchluBstein von dem ganzen Gebüude eines Systems derreinen, selbst der spekulativen, Vernunft aus", KpV, AA V 3-4.
This synthetical active subject has to put together the intellectual and empirical sides of
knowledge, the pure active subject and the subject in time. He knows the problem: "Der Satz aber,
Ich denke, so fern er so viel sagt, als: ich existiere denkend, ist nicht bloBe logische Funktion, son¬
dem bestimmet das Subjekt (welches denn zugleich Objekt ist) in Ansehung der Existenz, und
kann ohne den inneren Sinn nicht stattfinden (...) In ihm ist also schon nicht mehr bloBe Spon¬
taneity des Denkens, sondem auch Rezeptivitat der Anschauung, d. i. das Denken meiner selbst
auf die empirische Anschauung eben desselben Subjekts angewandt", B429-30 . But we haven't
yet a proper explication. We only find new elaborations of the problem in the Opus postumum.
One of the values of the Opus postumum, but not the most important, consists in showing
that Kant's philosophy remained alive and open until the end. After dealing with the subjects
of physics and after long discussions about ether, he turned back to the main themes of critical
philosophy (in 1799 at the age of 75). Ether was no longer a physical element but rather a tran¬
scendental principle that made physics possible. This thought led him to the ideas of autoafec-
tion and autoposition. Now the point is similar to the one that caused the discussion with
Descartes in 1787; that is, the foundation of an external objective reference, and as a conse¬
quence, we encounter a new discussion about the "cogito' in 1799-1801.
Kant tries to define the idea of the synthetic apperception in a systematical way. In fact,
he speaks no more of apperception but of autoposition as the unitarian source of whole philo¬
sophy, both theoretical and practical.
DaB der Mensch nicht allein denkt sondem auch zu sicli selbst sagen kann ich denke mach ihn zu einer
Person", Op, A A XXI 103, 19-20.
Kant avoids the two extremes, the "cogito' as just a tautological principle, and the "cogi¬
to' as a metaphysical substance. The "ich denke' is analytical, but not as a judgment or reason¬
ing but rather as an act of selbstobjectivatlon.
Es wird mir also in dem Satz ich bin denkend weil er gantz identisch ist gar kein Fortschritt kein
synthetisches Urtheil gegeben denn er ist tautologisch und der vermeynte SchluB: ich denke daruin ich
bin ist kein SchluB; sondern der erste Act des Erkenntnisses ist: ich bin mir selbst ein Gegenstand desDenkens (cogitabile) und der Anschauung (dabile)", Op.AA XXII 79.5
5 "Ich bin existierend enthalt die Apprehension, d. i., ist nicht bios ein subjectives Urtheil sondern macht michselbst zum Object der Anschauung im Raume und der Zeit", Op, AA XXII 96.
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The first act is the position of the subject as an object; that is, the setting of himself as
space and time. The practical idea of autonomy is the first principle of all, and the making of
himselfmeans that the subject has to establish his own receptivity. This autoposition explains
the neccesary connection ofsensibility and understanding that remained unexplained in the first
Critique.
Das sum ist em Verbum wodurch icli micli selbst setze.... Der erste analytische Act des BewuBtseyns
ist der durch welclien das Subject sicli selbst zum Gegenstande der Anschauung macbt, nicht logisch
(analytisch) nach der Regel der Identitat sondem metaphyslscli (synthetiscli). Op, AA XXII 85.
Descartes could give some grounds for analytical geometry but not for mathematical phy¬
sics6 and even less for moral philosophy. As for Kant, the subject establishes space and time,
so that he as an active mobile subject can fulfil their concrete configuration and, at the same
time, set in this way the frame for his moral activity.7
6 "Les constructions cinématiques, qui ne servaient à Descartes que de méthode auxiliare dans sa Géométrie,
donnent lieu chez Kant à un premier principe", Vuillemin, J. Mathématiques et métaphysique chez Descartes,
l'UF, Paris, I960, p. 124.
7 "Ich bin denkend ist ein analytischer Satz der nicht einen Schlus (cogito, ergo sum) enthalt sondem nur die
Autonomie der symbetischen Erkcnntnis a priori mich selbst nach Principien zu bestimmen und zur Erlahrung als
einem System (Physik) fortzuschreiten". Op, AA XXI 102.
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